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REAL-TIME DETECTION SYSTEM FOR SUSPICIOUS URL’S: 
 
1 Project Description 
1.1 Project Abstract 
Twitter is prone to malicious tweets containing URLs for spam, phishing, and malware 
distribution. Conventional Twitter spam detection schemes utilize account features such as the 
ratio of tweets containing URLs and the account creation date, or relation features in the Twitter 
graph. These detection schemes are ineffective against feature fabrications or consume much 
time and resources. Conventional suspicious URL detection schemes utilize several features 
including lexical features of URLs, URL redirection, HTML content, and dynamic behavior. 
However, evading techniques such as time-based evasion and crawler evasion exist. In this 
paper, we propose WARNINGBIRD, a suspicious Real-Time URL detection system for Twitter. 
Our system investigates correlations of URL redirect chains extracted from several tweets. 
Because attackers have limited resources and usually reuse them, their URL redirect chains 
frequently share the same URLs. We develop methods to discover correlated URL redirect 
chains using the frequently shared URLs and to determine their suspiciousness. We collect 
numerous tweets from the Twitter public timeline and build a statistical classifier using them. 
Evaluation results show that our classifier accurately and efficiently detects suspicious URLs 
 
1.2 Competitive Information 
In the existing system attackers use shortened malicious URLs that redirect Twitter users 
to external attack servers. To cope with malicious tweets, several Twitter spam detection 
schemes have been proposed. These schemes can be classified into account feature-based, 
relation feature-based, and message feature based schemes. Account feature-based schemes use 
the distinguishing features of spam accounts such as the ratio of tweets containing URLs, the 
account creation date, and the number of followers and friends. However, malicious users can 
easily fabricate these account features. The relation feature-based schemes rely on more robust 
features that malicious users cannot easily fabricate such as the distance and connectivity 
apparent in the Twitter graph. Extracting these relation features from a Twitter graph, however, 
requires a significant amount of time and resources as a Twitter graph is tremendous in size. The 
 
     Page 2 of 22 
message feature-based scheme focused on the lexical features of messages. However, spammers 
can easily change the shape of their messages. A number of suspicious URL detection schemes 
have also been introduced. 
1.3 Relationship to Other Applications/Projects 
To adapt to noxious tweets, a few Twitter spam identification plans have been proposed. These 
plans can be characterized into record highlight based, connection highlight based, and message, 
for example, the proportion of tweets containing URLs, the record creation date, and the quantity 
of adherents highlight based plans. Record highlight based plans utilize the recognizing elements 
of spam records and companions. 
1.4 Assumptions and Dependencies 
 
The connection highlight construct plans depend in light of more powerful elements that 
malevolent clients can't without much of a stretch manufacture, for example, the separation and 
network obvious in the Twitter chart. Removing these connection highlights from a Twitter 
diagram, on the other hand, requires a lot of time and assets as a Twitter chart is gigantic in size. 
The message highlight construct plan centered with respect to the lexical elements of messages. 
Be that as it may, spammers can without much of a stretch change the state of their messages. 
Various suspicious URL recognition plans have additionally been presented. 
1.5 Definitions and Acronyms 
 
Definition 
 
Phishing: Phishing email will typically direct the user to visit a website where they are asked to 
update personal information, such as a password, credit card, social security, or bank account 
numbers, that the legitimate organization already has. The website, however, is bogus and will 
capture and steal any information the user enters on the page. 
Crawler:  A crawler is a program that visits Web sites and reads their pages and other 
information in order to create entries for a search engine index Crawlers are typically 
programmed to visit sites that have been submitted by their owners as new or updated. Entire 
sites or specific pages can be selectively visited and indexed. 
 
Acronyms 
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URL- Uniform Resource Locator 
HTTP- Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
HTML- Hypertext Markup Language. 
2 Technical Description 
In this paper, we propose WARNINGBIRD, a suspicious URL detection system for Twitter. 
Instead of investigating the landing pages of individual URLs in each tweet, which may not be 
successfully fetched, we considered correlations of URL redirect chains extracted from a number 
of tweets. Because attacker’s resources are generally limited and need to be reused, their URL 
redirect chains usually share the same URLs. We therefore created a method to detect correlated 
URL redirect chains using such frequently shared URLs. By analyzing the correlated URL 
redirect chains and their tweet context information, we discover several features that can be used 
to classify suspicious URLs. We collected a large number of tweets from the Twitter public 
timeline and trained a statistical classifier using the discovered features. 
 We present a new suspicious URL detection system for Twitter that is based on the 
correlations of URL redirect chains, which are difficult to fabricate. The system can find 
correlated URL redirect chains using the frequently shared URLs and determine their 
suspiciousness in almost real time. 
 We introduce new features of suspicious URLs: some of which are newly discovered and 
while others are variations of previously discovered features. 
 We present the results of investigations conducted on suspicious URLs that have been 
widely distributed through Twitter over several months. 
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2.1 Project/Application Architecture 
 
 
 
2.2 Project/Application Information flows 
 
 
Module Description: 
1. Data collection 
2. Feature extraction 
3. Training 
4. Classification 
 
Data collection: The data collection component has two subcomponents: the collection of tweets 
with URLs and crawling for URL redirections. To collect tweets with URLs and their context 
information from the Twitter public timeline, this component uses Twitter Streaming APIs. 
Whenever this component obtains a tweet with a URL, it executes a crawling thread that follows 
all redirections of the URL and looks up the corresponding IP addresses. The crawling thread 
appends these retrieved URL and IP chains to the tweet information and pushes it into a tweet 
queue. As we have seen, our crawler cannot reach malicious landing. 
URLs when they use conditional redirections to evade crawlers. However, because our detection 
system does not rely on the features of landing URLs, it works independently of such crawler 
evasions. 
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Feature extraction: The feature extraction component has three subcomponents: grouping of 
identical domains, finding entry point URLs, and extracting feature vectors. 
This component monitors the tweet queue to determine whether a sufficient number of tweets 
have been collected. Specifically, our system uses a tweet window instead of individual tweets. 
When more than w tweets are collected (w is 10,000 in the current implementation), it pops w 
tweets from the tweet queue. First, for all URLs in the w tweets, this component checks whether 
they share the same IP addresses. If several URLs share at least one IP address, it replaces their 
domain names with a list of domains with which they are grouped. 
 
Training: The training component has two subcomponents: retrieval of account statuses and 
training of the classifier. Because we use an offline supervised learning algorithm, the feature 
vectors for training are relatively older than feature vectors for classification. To label the 
training vectors, we use the Twitter account status; URLs from suspended accounts are 
considered malicious whereas URLs from active accounts are considered benign. We 
periodically update our classifier using labeled training vectors. 
Classification: The classification component executes our classifier using input feature vectors 
to classify suspicious URLs. When the classifier returns a number of malicious feature vectors, 
this component flags the corresponding URLs and their tweet information as suspicious. 
These URLs, detected as suspicious, will be delivered to security experts or more sophisticated 
dynamic analysis environments for an in-depth investigation. 
 
2.3 Interactions with other Projects (if Any) 
 
We compared the efficiency of WARNINGBIRD with that of Twitter’s detection system. For the 
comparison, we sampled 14,905 accounts detected by our online WARNINGBIRD system 
between September1,2011 and October 22, 2011. To compare their efficiencies, we measured the 
time difference between WARNINGBIRD’s detection and Twitter’s suspension of the accounts. 
We monitored the WARNINGBIRD to obtain newly detected suspicious accounts and then 
checked the status of each account every 15 s, for one day, until it was suspended. Among the 
sampled accounts, 5,380 accounts were suspended within a day; 37.3% of them were suspended 
within a minute, another 44.3% of them were suspended within four hours, and the remaining 
18.4% of them were suspended within a day. 
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The average time difference was 13.5 min, which shows that our detection system is more 
efficient than that of Twitter. We also checked the status of the sampled accounts on October 28, 
2011 to verify the accuracy of our system. Among the 14,905 accounts, Twitter had suspended 
9,250 accounts. We then randomly selected 500 accounts from the remaining 5,655 active 
accounts to manually check how suspect they were. Among the 500 accounts, 320 accounts were 
suspicious. Therefore, the detection accuracy of our system given the sample data is about 
86.3%. 
2.4 Interactions with other Applications 
 
Although WARNINGBIRD is suitable for detecting frequent suspicious URLs distributed by bot 
accounts (which are common on Twitter[30]),we need to consider more advanced attacks using 
compromised accounts . We can classify compromised Twitter accounts into two types: (i) 
accounts authorizing malicious applications and (ii) accounts stolen by attackers. Twitter users 
may accidently (or intentionally) authorize malicious applications luring them with interesting 
advertisements, such as enticements to increase the number of their followers or notify them 
regarding their unfollowers. User accounts may also be stolen by attackers guessing or stealing 
their passwords. In such cases, five account similarity-based features, i.e., the number of source 
applications and the similarities in the account creation dates, the number of followers, the 
number of friends, and the follower-friend ratio, are no longer effective. 
 
2.5 Capabilities 
 
 We present a new suspicious URL detection system for Twitter that is based on the 
correlations of URL redirect chains, which are difficult to fabricate. The system can find 
correlated URL redirect chains using the frequently shared URLs and determine their 
suspiciousness in almost real time. 
 We introduce new features of suspicious URLs: some of which are newly discovered and 
while others are variations of previously discovered features. 
 We present the results of investigations conducted on suspicious URLs that have been 
widely distributed through Twitter over several months 
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2.6 Risk Assessment and Management 
 
Multiple redirections: Web pages can embed several external pages and different content. 
Therefore, some pages can cause multiple redirections. Because our system currently only 
considers HTTP redirection and does not consider page-level redirection, it cannot catch multiple 
redirections. Therefore, we need customized browsers to catch and address multiple redirections. 
Dynamic redirection: Currently, WARNINGBIRD uses a static crawler written in Python. 
Because it can only handle HTTP redirections, it is ineffective on pages that have embedded 
dynamic redirections such as JavaScript or Flash redirection. Therefore, WARNINGBIRD will 
designate pages with embedded dynamic redirection as entry point URLs. This determination 
causes inaccuracy in some of the feature values, including the redirect chain lengths, positions of 
the entry point URLs, and the number of different landing URLs. Therefore, in the future we will 
use customized Web browsers to fully retrieve redirect chains. 
Coverage and scalability: Currently, our system only monitors one percent of the samples from 
the Twitter public timeline, because our accounts only have the Spritzer access role. The current 
implementation, however, cannot handle100%oftheTwitterpublictimeline.Therefore,we need to 
extend WARNINGBIRD to a distributed detection system, for instance, Monarch [19], to handle 
the entire Twitter public timeline. 
 
3 Project Requirements 
 
3.1 Identification of Requirements 
 
We performed a simple investigation on three days’ worth of tweet samples culled from July 23 
to 25, 2011. We extracted frequent URL redirect chains from the sample data and ranked them 
according to their frequency after removing white listed domain names. Many suspicious sites, 
such as  jbfollowme.com, which attempts to attract Justin Bieber’s fans, proved to be highly 
ranked. 
We consider blackraybansunglasses.com, which is a suspicious site associated with spam tweets. 
We first encountered this site in April 2011 and it was active until August 2011. We used a one 
percent of a sample of tweets collected on July 11, 2011, to conduct an in-depth analysis of the 
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site . blackraybansunglasses.com has a page, redirect.php, which conditionally redirects users to 
random spam pages. It uses a number of different Twitter accounts and shortened URLs to 
distribute its URL to other Twitter users. According to our dataset, it uses 6,585 different Twitter 
accounts and shortened URLs, and occupies about 2.83% of the sampled 232,333 tweets with 
URLs. When a user clicks on one of the shortened URLs, such as bit.ly/raCz5i distributed by 
zarzuelavbafpv0, heorshewillberedirectedtoaprivate redirection site, such as beginnersatlanta.tk, 
which seems to be managed by the operator of blackraybansunglasses.com. The user will then be 
repeatedly redirected to bestfreevideoonline.info and blackraybansunglasses.com. The 
redirection site blackraybansunglasses.com evaluates whether its visitors are normal browsers or 
crawlers using several methods, including cookie and user-agent checking. When it is sure that a 
current visitor is a normal browser, it redirects the visitor to forexstrategysite.com, which then 
finally redirects him or her to random spam pages. When blackraybansunglasses.com determines 
that a current visitor is not a normal browser, it simply redirects the visitor to google.com to 
avoid investigation. Therefore, crawlers may not be able to see forexstrategysite.com or the 
further spam pages. Another interesting point about blackraybansunglasses.com is that it uses the 
Twitter Web interface. Conventional Twitter spam detection schemes usually assumed that many 
spammers would use Twitter APIs to distribute their spam tweets. Advanced Twitter spammers, 
however, no longer rely on Twitter APIs, because they know that using APIs will distinguish 
their tweets from normal tweets. For instance, tweetattacks.com  sells a Twitter spam program 
that uses the Web interface to deceive spam receivers and to circumvent API limits 
 
3.2 Operations, Administration, Maintenance and Provisioning (OAM&P) 
 
We have provided our customers to use this project on real time basis by providing online 
detection. 
The online version of WARNINGBIRD uses a sliding window technique for achieving good 
latency and detection coverage. A small window gives immediate results; however, it cannot 
catch suspicious URLs that repeat after long-time intervals. A large window has good detection 
coverage; however, its latency is bad. A sliding window is a well-known technique for taking 
advantage of both small and large windows. Let w denote the window size and s denote the 
sliding size(s ≤ w).Whenever a sliding window system receives s new items, it processes the 
previous w −s items and the s new items at the same time. Therefore, the latency of this method 
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depends on s and its detection coverage depends on w. Currently, we have set w at 10,000 and s 
at 2,000. About every 12 min, the online version of WARNINGBIRD returns suspicious URLs 
that have appeared 
In the previous hour—near real time detection. Because our system can process 10,000 collected 
tweets in less than one minute (Fig. 12), we can detect suspicious URLs with only one-minute 
time lags. In addition, we could set s at 200 to detect suspicious URLs about every 1.2 min. 
However, because we do not want to make our system heavily burdened, we have not use such 
parameter. 
 
3.3 Security and Fraud Prevention 
 
Feature evasion methods: Attackers can fabricate the features of their attacks to evade our 
detection system. For instance, they can use short redirect chains, change the position of their 
entry point URLs, reuse initial and landingURLs, or use a small number of different domain 
names and IP addresses. These modifications, paradoxically, would allow conventional detection 
systems to detect their malicious URLs. Attackers may also be able to reduce the frequency of 
their tweets to bypass our detection system. However, this would also reduce the number of 
visitors to their malicious pages. Features derived from tweet information, however, are 
relatively weak at protecting against forgery. Attackers could use a large number of source 
applications and Twitter accounts, use similar tweet texts, and carefully adjust the numbers of 
followers and friends of their accounts to increase the standard deviation values. In addition, they 
could increase the standard deviation of their account creation date if they own or have 
compromised older accounts. Although these features are weak, attackers have to consume their 
resources and time to fabricate these features. Therefore, using these features is still meaningful. 
The strongest evasion method is definitely to increase the number of redirect servers. This 
method, however, would require a lot of resource and large financial investment on the part of 
the attackers. 
Adaptation to the other services: Although WARNINGBIRD is designed for Twitter, with some 
simple modifications it can also be applied to other services that can monitor a continuous URL 
stream. For example, we can consider an e-mail service that continuously processes a large 
number of e-mails for its users. Its operators can collect and investigate e-mails containing 
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URLs. When a proper number of such e-mails are collected, the URL based features can be 
extracted, such as the length of the URL redirect chain, the frequency of entry point URLs, and 
the number of different initial and landing URLs. The operators can also extract other features 
from e-mail context information such as the number of senders and receivers, the number of mail 
servers and relay servers, and similarities in e-mail messages. Web forum services are also 
similar; as their operators can collect all posts and comments of users containing URLs and can 
extract URL-based features as well as other features including user IDs, IP addresses, and 
message similarities. We can modify WARNINGBIRD to use the above features for detecting 
suspicious URLs on those systems. A similar method can also be applied to other social 
networking services such as Facebook and Google+. 
3.4 Release and Transition Plan 
 
In this paper, we propose WARNINGBIRD, a suspicious URL detection system for Twitter. 
Instead of investigating the landing pages of individual URLs in each tweet, which may not be 
successfully fetched, we considered correlations of URL redirect chains extracted from a number 
of tweets. Because attacker’s resources are generally limited and need to be reused, their URL 
redirect chains usually share the same URLs. We therefore created a method to detect correlated 
URL redirect chains using such frequently shared URLs. By analyzing the correlated URL 
redirect chains and their tweet context information, we discover several features that can be used 
to classify suspicious URLs. We collected a large number of tweets from the Twitter public 
timeline and trained a statistical classifier using the discovered features. The trained classifier is 
shown to be accurate and has low false positives and negatives. 
A number of suspicious URL detection schemes  have also been introduced. They use static or 
dynamic crawlers, and they may be executed in virtual machine honeypots, such as Capture-HPC 
, HoneyMonkey , and Wepawet, to investigate newly observed URLs. These schemes classify 
URLs according to several features including lexical features of URLs, DNS information, URL 
redirections, and the HTML content of the landing pages. Nevertheless, malicious servers can 
bypass an investigation by selectively providing benign pages to crawlers. For instance, because 
static crawlers usually cannot handle JavaScript or Flash, malicious servers can use them to 
deliver. 
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4 Project Design Description 
Our system consists of two Intel Quad Core Xeon E5530 2.40GHz CPUs and 24 GiB of main 
memory. To collect the tweets, we used Twitter Streaming APIs [31]. Our accounts have a Spritzer 
access role, and thus we can collect about one percent of all tweets from the Twitter public timeline as 
samples. From April 8 to December 8, 2011 (245 days in total), we collected 59,056,761 samples of 
tweets with URLs. We observed about 240,000 tweets daily on average. Our system visited all the 
URLs in the tweets to collect the URL redirect chains. In addition, starting on July 23, our system 
collected the IP addresses of all URLs for the domain grouping. From the collected tweets, we found 
13,261,069 unique Twitter accounts. Among them, 1,339,496 accounts (10.1%) were suspended as of 
January 15, 2012. 
Twitter announced that it had started to wrap URLs with lengths longer than 19 characters using its 
URL shortening service t.co [33] from August 15, 2011 and that it started to wrap all URLs regardless 
of their length from October 10, 2011 [34]. We noticed that this additional layer of URL redirections 
affects our classification results; therefore, from August 15, 2011, we decided to remove the first t.co 
URLs in redirect chains. 
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     SPIRALMODEL 
Labeling is essential for classification. Unfortunately, we were unable to find a suitable source 
for labeling our datasets, as many of the URLs in our datasets have not been listed on a public 
URL blacklist, such as the Google Safe Browsing API. Therefore, instead of URL blacklists, we 
used Twitter account status information to label our datasets. That is, if some accounts had 
posted the same URLs andTwitter suspended the account slater,we regarded theURLs as 
malicious. Otherwise,we regarded them as benign. Our treatment of URLs is acceptable as 
Thomas et al. have recently confirmed that most suspended accounts are spam accounts. 
 
5 Project Internal/external Interface Impacts and Specification 
Since we rely on the results of Twitter’s spam account detection system to label the collected datasets, 
one can argue that it just mimics the Twitter’s detection system at most. However, most of our 
features are independent of the Twitter’s rules that focus on the suspicious characteristics of individual 
accounts, such as aggressive following, many tweets with (blacklisted) URLs, a small number of 
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followers compared to the number of followings, and frequently blocked or reported by other users. 
Twitter can know whether an account violates the rules or not only after the account have performed a 
series of activities. However, unlike the rules, we focus on the characteristics of URL redirect chains 
and the similarity of a group of users who uploaded the same URL redirect chains; our system can 
immediately check them. We also verified that our system can detect suspicious accounts that Twitter 
cannot detect even several days later. Therefore, we can say that our system is not a simple mimic of 
the Twitter’s detection system. Because the Twitter’s detection system had a time delay for suspicious 
account detection, we checked the status information of accounts at least one month later from their 
posting of tweets. 
Since Twitter is an evolving system, the features of accounts and URLs on the system could change 
with time. To know how they had been changed during our data collection periods, we checked the F-
scores of our features in each month between May 2011 and November2011,and compared six 
features that had high F-scores in some of the months. The F-scores of the similarity of account 
creation dates and the relative number of initial URLs had not much changed during the months. This 
is because the differences between the average feature values of them had not much changed (Fig. 11). 
On the other hand, the F-scores of the relative number of source applications and the frequency of 
entry point URLs had increased during the months owing to the reduced number of malicious 
applications and the reduced frequency of benign URLs. We think the reasons why they reduced are 
Twitter’s efforts to reduce the number of malicious applications and less sampled tweets containing 
the same benign URLs due to the continuous growth of the number of tweet sit implies that attackers 
had changed the characteristics of their accounts to avoid detection. two possible explanations are i) 
attackers really had reduced the lengths of redirect chains because too long chains could be treated as 
malicious, or ii) they had applied dynamic redirections to prevent simple static. 
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6 Project Design Units Imp 
6.1 Functional Area/Design UnitA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    DEPLOYMENT DIAGRAM 
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6.1.1 Functional Overview 
 
.     ACTIVITY DIAGRAM 
6.1.2 Impacts 
 
The features derived from there late tweet context information are variations of previously 
discovered features. However, unlike previous studies that have focused on the differences 
between malicious and benign accounts, we focused on the similarity of the features of accounts 
distributing the same entry point URLs. Preparing a large number of dissimilar Twitter accounts 
View Follower View Tweets
Collect All Urls VIew All Tweets users
User Login
User Home
Logout
Enter LoginID and Password
Login Success
Login Fail
Normal Browser urls Crawlers Urls Redirect  chain Urls
View Blocked Urls
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for distributing spam URLs becomes a burden to attackers; therefore, similarity checking is 
effective. 
Relative number of different initial URLs: The initial URL is the beginning URL that redirects 
visitors to the current entry point URL. Attackers usually use a large number of different initial 
URLs to make their malicious tweets, which redirect visitors to the same malicious URL, look 
different. The number of different initial .URLs cannot exceed the number of times that their 
entry point URLs appear. Therefore, if the number of different initial.Content may change prior 
to final publication.URLs redirecting visitors to an entry point URL that appears n times is i, this 
feature can be computed as i n. 
6.1.3 Requirements 
 
 
HARDWARE CONFIGURATION:- 
Processor  - Pentium –IV 
RAM  -     512MB 
Hard disk             -           80GB 
 
SOFTWARE CONFIGURATION 
Operating System       : Windows 2007 
Programming Language      : JAVA 
Frontend                                                 : JSP, Servlets 
Backend                                                 : oracle11g 
IDE                                                        : my eclipse 8.6 
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6.2 Functional Area/Design Unit B 
 
     COLLABORATION DIAGRAM 
 
user
mytweets
Followers
Following user
tweets
worning bird
login
1 : login()
2 : viewtweets()
3 : delete tweets()
4 : view followers()
5 : view followers tweets()
6 : view users follow users()
7 : View user tweets()
8 : delete user tweets()
9 : posts tweet()
10 : view all tweets users()
11 : normal browsers urls()
12 : crawlers browsers urls()
13 : redirect chain urls()
14 : data colletion urls()
15 : domain wise urls()
16 : detect attacker urls()
 
     Page 18 of 22 
6.2.1 Functional Overview 
 
     STATECHART DIARAM 
 
We used sample tweets collected between September 2011 and October 2011 to train the 
classification models and sample tweets collected during August 2011 and during November 
2011 for testing the classifier using older and newer datasets, respectively. From the training 
dataset, we found 183,846 entry point URLs that appeared more than once in every 10,000 
consecutive sample tweets. Among them, 156,896 entry point URLs were benign and 26,950 
View Follower View Tweets
Collect All Urls VIew All Tweets users
User Login
User Home
Logout
Enter LoginID and Password
Login Success
Login Fail
Normal Browser urls Crawlers Urls Redirect  chain Urls
View Blocked Urls
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entry point URLs were malicious. We used the LIBLINEAR library to implement our classifier. 
We compared seven classification algorithms, and selected an L2-regularized L1-loss support 
vector classification (SVC) algorithm, since it shows the highest AUC and the lowest FP with the 
training dataset, experimentally.  Table shows the results here,LRisan abbreviation of logistic 
regression, SVC is support vector classification, AUC is area under the ROC curve, FP is false 
positive, FN is false negative, L1R and L2R are L1and L2-regularized, and primal and dual 
represent functions that determine termination of training. Standard deviations of the AUC were 
0.0029–0.0032, those of the accuracy were 0.17%–0.20%, those of the FP were 0.05%– 0.09%, 
and those of the FN were 0.18%–0.19% 
 
Comparing classifiers within a 10- fold cross validation 
 
 
6.2.2 Impacts 
 
 We present a new suspicious URL detection system for Twitter that is based on the 
correlations of URL redirect chains, which are difficult to fabricate. The system can find 
correlated URL redirect chains using the frequently shared URLs and determine their 
suspiciousness in almost real time. 
 We introduce new features of suspicious URLs: some of which are newly discovered and 
while others are variations of previously discovered features. 
 We present the results of investigations conducted on suspicious URLs that have been 
widely distributed through Twitter over several months. 
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6.2.3 Requirements 
 
URL redirect chain length: Attackers usually use long URL redirect chains to make 
1investigations more difficult and avoid a dismantling gof their servers.Therefore,when an entry 
point URL is malicious, its chain length l may be longer than those of benign URLs. Frequency 
of entry point URL: The number of occurrences of the current entry point URL within a tweet 
window is important. Frequently appearing URLs that are not whitelisted are usually deemed 
suspicious. Suspicious entry point URLs are not usually located at the end of a redirect chain 
since they have to conditionally redirect visitors to different landing URLs. Their positions are 
relative to the lengths of their redirect chains. Therefore, if the position of an entry point of a 
redirect chain of length l is p, this feature can be computed as p/l. 
 
 
7 Open Issues 
Specialized – Relating to an innovative issue in the task.  
II. Business process – Relating to the venture's outline.  
III. Change administration – Relating to school, understudies, or ecological changes.  
IV. Asset – Relating to hardware, material, or individuals issues.  
V. Outsider – Relating to issues with outside plannin 
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Module Description: 
1. Data collection 
2. Feature extraction 
3. Training 
4. Classification 
Data collection: The data collection component has two subcomponents: the collection of tweets 
with URLs and crawling for URL redirections. To collect tweets with URLs and their context 
information from the Twitter public timeline, this component uses Twitter Streaming APIs. 
Whenever this component obtains a tweet with a URL, it executes a crawling thread that follows 
all redirections of the URL and looks up the corresponding IP addresses. The crawling thread 
appends these retrieved URL and IP chains to the tweet information and pushes it into a tweet 
queue. As we have seen, our crawler cannot reach malicious landing. 
URLs when they use conditional redirections to evade crawlers. However, because our detection 
system does not rely on the features of landing URLs, it works independently of such crawler 
evasions. 
Feature extraction: The feature extraction component has three subcomponents: grouping of 
identical domains, finding entry point URLs, and extracting feature vectors. 
This component monitors the tweet queue to determine whether a sufficient number of tweets 
have been collected. Specifically, our system uses a tweet window instead of individual tweets. 
When more than w tweets are collected (w is 10,000 in the current implementation), it pops w 
tweets from the tweet queue. First, for all URLs in the w tweets, this component checks whether 
they share the same IP addresses. If several URLs share at least one IP address, it replaces their 
domain names with a list of domains with which they are grouped. 
Training: The training component has two subcomponents: retrieval of account statuses and 
training of the classifier. Because we use an offline supervised learning algorithm, the feature 
vectors for training are relatively older than feature vectors for classification. To label the 
training vectors, we use the Twitter account status; URLs from suspended accounts are 
considered malicious whereas URLs from active accounts are considered benign. We 
periodically update our classifier using labeled training vectors. 
Classification: The classification component executes our classifier using input feature vectors 
to classify suspicious URLs. When the classifier returns a number of malicious feature vectors, 
this component flags the corresponding URLs and their tweet information as suspicious. 
These URLs, detected as suspicious, will be delivered to security experts or more sophisticated 
dynamic analysis environments for an in-depth investigation. 
 
